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N A T IO N A L

L. Douglas Wilder

The November Elections
And the Politics of
Deracialization
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1990

By Joseph P. McCormick, 2nd

he election results of Tuesday,
November 7, 1989, with the victor
ies by African American candidates
in a variety of settings, have led political
pundits and other would-be analysts to
offer a variety of opinions on what has
been the impact of one of the most in
fluential features in American electoral
politics, the role of race. This article
examines the elections where African
Americans captured the chief executive’s
post, in both large cities and in the state
of Virginia, discusses some of the more
salient features of these victories, and
then describes a pragmatic political
strategy that may help to explain why
these Blacks won.

T

The Dinkins and Wilder Campaigns

Much of the media attention has been
focused on the victories of David Dinkins
(’50 graduate of Howard’s College of Lib
eral Arts) as mayor of New York City and
L. Douglas Wilder (’59 graduate of
Howard’s School of Law) as governor of
Virginia. The outcomes of these contests
represent “firsts” for the city of New
York and for the state of Virginia. In both
of these contests Wilder and Dinkins
faced white opponents in electorates
where whites constituted the majority of
the registered voters. Both won by mar
gins considerably less than had been pre
dicted weeks before the November 7th
election (Dinkins by about three percent
and Wilder by less than one percent).1
Given the makeup of their respective
electorates, Wilder and Dinkins crafted
campaigns designed to generate support
from African Americans as well as white
voters. Interestingly, in both Virginia and
New York City, the victors gained major
ity support from those who were prochoice on the volatile abortion issue.
Dinkins purportedly got 58 percent of his
votes from those New Yorkers who were

Experience as an elected
official is an asset in any
electoral contest. It is that
much more of an asset for
an African American can
didate . . .

seen in some of the other contests
around the nation where African Ameri
can candidates won on November 7th.
Victories in Large Cities

As of January, 1988 about 60 percent of
the 6,793 African Americans who held
office in the United States were at either
the county or city levels.5 Given this dis
tribution, there were undoubtedly a
number of victories on November 7th
where African American incumbents re
tained their offices while others were
elected to office for the first time. Here
the discussion focuses on the larger
cities (population >100,000) where Afri
can Americans were elected or re
elected as mayors. The composition of
the electorate, in most of these cities,
pro-choice. He also gathered in about 30 forced many of the victors to take up a
percent of the white vote.2 Wilder, on racially transcendent message that pro
the other hand, gained 40 to 43 percent duced the multi-racial coalition needed to
of the white vote. This is in a state where win.
whites make up about 80 percent of the
The most noticeable characteristic
general population. African Americans shared by the African Americans who
represent about 18 percent of the popu won office in seven of the largest cities
lation.3 Wilder forged a bi-racial coalition (including New York) is that all had pre
of African Americans (from throughout viously held an elective office (see Table
the state) and young white voters (large 1.). Of these seven, two were incumbent
ly from northern Virginia) to win. One mayors (Carrie Perry in Hartford and
journalistic account of Wilder’s victory Coleman Young in Detroit). Two pre
pointed out:
viously held office as state senators
“Although Wilder made a special effort (Mike White in Cleveland and John
. . . to energize the black vote, he did so Daniels in New Haven). Two held office
with a message about statewide political as city councilmen (Chester Jenkins in
and economic progress—one that was Durham and Norman Rice in Seattle).
appealing to white voters as well. By The seventh, (David Dinkins in New
fashioning a political message that tran York) had been Manhattan borough
scended racial lines, Wilder left unan president.
Experience as an elected official is an
swered questions about any special goals
asset in any electoral contest. It is that
he may have to help black Virginians.”4
As was the case with Wilder, the com much more of an asset for an African
position of New York’s electorate forced American candidate who seeks to run for
Dinkins to weld together a multi-racial office. The 1984 and 1988 presidential
coalition by advancing a racially transcen campaigns of Jesse Jackson clearly re
dent message. Evidence of the apparent vealed how a candidate may be con
appeal of this sort of message can be fronted with the “insufficient experience”
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challenge from would-be detractors.
The mayoral elections in Cleveland
and Detroit shared two characteristics
that separated them from the other five
large cities where African Americans
won. First, both Cleveland and Detroit
are cities where African Americans make
up at least half of the eligible voters. Sec
ond, in both of these contests, the vic
tors faced other African American
opponents. Coleman Young, the fourterm incumbent mayor of Detroit, de
feated accountant Thomas Barrow.
Young is reported to have won about
two-thirds of the African American vote
and 15 to 35 percent of the white vote in
a city where African Americans comprise
more than 60 percent of the total popu
lation.6 The power of incumbency (and
the attendant experience) along with the
size of the Black electorate in Detroit es
sentially meant that Young did not have
to be as concerned in appealing to whites
as was the case for Blacks who sought to
win in many of these other large cities.
In Cleveland, State Senator Mike
White defeated former City Councilman
Chair George Forbes. Forbes, a 26-year
veteran of Cleveland’s City Council and
its turbulent history of racially divisive
politics, was unable to make much of an
appeal to the city’s white electorate. This
is not at all surprising given Forbes’ com
bative style which throughout his public
career in Cleveland had frequently put
him at loggerheads with white politi
cians, both Democrat and Republican.7
While Cleveland is perhaps the most
racially polarized large city, Mike White
was able to gain enough support to win.
Ironically, in Cleveland, where racial bloc
voting in local elections has been the
norm for the past 25 years, the white
electorate found itself in a situation very
familiar to African Americans—the
choice of a “lesser of two evils”: the
younger state senator who made a con
certed effort to appeal to white voters
versus the older more combative veteran
politician who apparently hoped that Afri
can Americans support alone would be
sufficient to win.
In the other five cities, each candidate
faced a white opponent (see: Table 1). In
four of these cities—Hartford, New
Haven, New York, and Seattle—African
Americans make up less than half of the
electorate.8 Of these four cities, in only
one, Hartford, was there an African
American incumbent. Mayor Carrie
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Perry retained office by gathering about
70 percent of the vote. Of these four
cities, Mayor Carrie Perry’s margin of
victory was the widest. Given its size as
a part of the total population in 1980
(see: Table 1), the African American
population of Hartford, in 1989, is prob
ably approaching 50 percent. This would
lead one to speculate that Perry’s cam
paign strategy' depended less on support
from white voters than was perhaps the
case in either New Haven, New York or
Seattle.
Table 1.

Selected Data for Cities (>100,000 pop.)
Where African Americans Won or Re
tained the Office of Mayor (Nov. 7,1989)

City & Name
Winner*
1.

C le v e la n d , O H

Percent African
Americans
(1980 census)

Percent
votes won

Race of
Opponent

55%

Black

43.8

56.4

Black

63.1

53

White

47.1

74.3

White

33.9

70

White

31.9

51

White

25.2

58

White

9.5

(Mike White)**
2.

D e tr o it, M l

(Coleman Ybung)**
3.

D u rh a m , NC

(Chester Jenkins)**
4.

H a r tfo r d , CT

5.

N e w H a v e n , CT

(Carrie Perry)***
(John Daniels)**
6.

N e w Y o rk , N Y

7.

S e a t t le , W A

(David Dinkins)**
(Norman Rice)**

Sources: These data were compiled from a variety of print
media sources within two days of these elections. Sub
sequent data analysis may yield percentage differences
slightly different from those reported here. The data
reported on the racial composition of the cities is the
most recently available from the U.S. Census Bureau.
*: Incumbent mayor Richard Dixon was re-elected in
Dayton, Ohio. No data on the margin of victory were
available at the time this paper was written.
* * : Winner previously held elected office other than that of
mayor.
* * * : Winner was the incumbent.

A bi-racial coalition was responsible
for the victory of two-term Councilman
Chester Jenkins in Durham, N.C. In the
aftermath of his win, Jenkins told the
press: “Black candidates can no longer
be perceived only as the candidates that
are interested in the social side of the
equation. We need also to stress to the
voters that we can handle fiscal responsi
bilities . . . We must be able to address
the pocketbook issues as well as the nonpocketbook issues.”9 Jenkins’ winning
effort brought together a coalition that
included labor, white liberals and envi
ronmentalists to defeat a Republican can
didate allied with conservative Senator
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.).10

The contest in Seattle is one where
victorious Norman Rice had little choice
but to forge a message that would have
significant appeal to a predominately
white electorate. African Americans
make up only 10 percent of the elec
torate in Seattle. Rice, a three-term city
councilman, is said to have opposed a di
visive referendum on the busing issue
that was on the ballot at the same time.
Given the racial divisions that have been
seen across the country on the busing
issue and the racial composition of the
electorate that he faced, it is not at all
surprising that Rice did not endorse
school busing. Rice’s margin of victory
was greater than in four large cities
where African Americans make up 25
percent or more of their respective elec
torates (see: Table 1).
The Political Strategy of Deracialization

In the aftermath of these victories on
November 7, 1989, students of Ameri
can electoral politics have asked whether
there is any underlying issue or theme
that runs through all these contests
where African Americans were success
ful. Given the variety of socio-economic
and demographic conditions that can be
found from Seattle to New York City, one
is hesitant to say that there is any signifi
cant tie that binds the outcomes of these
contests. Yet the available data on what is
known of the sort of issues discussed by
the candidates suggest consideration of
an explanation that links the outcomes of
most of the contests. This explanation
rests on the compelling logic of the politi
cal strategy of deracialization.
In the spring of 1976, political scientist
Charles Hamilton wrote a paper on what
he then perceived to be the approach the
national Democratic Party’s platform
should take toward issues of vital impor
tance to African Americans in the 1976
presidential campaign. The paper fo
cused on domestic policy issues. In a
subsequent effort to clarify his position,
Hamilton urged that a deracialized politi
cal strategy was one in which the Demo
cratic presidential candidate would seek
to emphasize those issues that would
have an appeal to broad segments of the
electorate across racial lines.11 As such,
calls for government to play a positive
role in the co-provision of decent paying
jobs and affordable health care, so Hamil
ton reasoned, were positions that a
Democratic presidential candidate could

In New York and Virginia,
Dinkins and Wilder took a
pro-choice stance on the
abortion issue. This . . .
gained support for both
. . . from women and prochoice activists.
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take (in 1976) that would have an appeal
to whites as well as African Americans.
The essence of this political strategy is
that its proponents would seek to deemphasize those issues that may be viewed
in explicitly racial terms, e.g., minority
set-asides, affirmative action, or the
plight of the urban underclass, while em
phasizing those issues that appear to
transcend the racial question; relevant
examples in 1989: abortion; the fiscal
health of the city or state; lower taxes or
at least the promise not to introduce
“new” taxes.
Hamilton further pointed out that
there were at least three assumptions
about the nature of American electoral
politics that were connected with this
political strategy:
(1) Political participants are willing to
act pragmatically and understand that
electoral gains, if made, were likely to be
incremental.
This first assumption appears to sug
gest that a candidate running for office,
may not win the first time, but that the
election may move the candidate in the
direction of eventual victory, given the
visibility and experience that the contest
will provide. In all of the cities where
non-incumbents won, only in Cleveland,
with a historic victory by Carl Stokes in
1967, had an African American candidate
previously been successful.12
(2) Political participants understand
that the ability to reward and punish is the
fundamental basis of political power.
This assumption suggests that those
who win electoral contests can ill afford
to ignore the voters who voted for the
opponent—especially in close contests—
for those same voters may be around in
the next election to either seek their re
venge against or to display their support
for the incumbent.
(3) Political participants realize that
elections in the American political system
are not for all time but occur from tune to
time.
Here Hamilton explains, " . . . a
strategy adopted for one election in a
particular context is not written in stone,
but is precisely a strategy used at that
time to maximize the possibility of
achieving certain goals, and which ought
to be seen in that very pragmatic, utili
tarian way.”13
An undercurrent of political pragma
tism that runs through this strategy is an
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1990

acknowledgement on the part of candi
dates for public office that race and
racism are facts of American political life.
These are features that can be exploited
or strategically side-stepped depending
on the race of the candidate and the sort
of advice that he or she receives.
Consider the most recent example of
an effort involving the exploitation of
racism. While President George Bush
denied any open endorsement of the
“Willie Horton” strategy in the recent

Jesse Jackson’s two tries
for the Democratic presi
dential nomination may
have awakened portions of
the white electorate . . .

presidential election, certainly his cam
paign strategist understood the sub
liminal power of connecting Governor
Michael Dukakis with a convicted African
American rapist and with a policy initia
tive (incorrectly) attributed to Dukakis.
Thus a strategy on the part of the Bush
campaign that linked a vote for the
Democratic presidential candidate with
the fears of the white electorate aided
the Republican Party in retaining control
of the White House in 1988.14
Correspondingly, Jesse Jackon’s cam
paign for the 1988 Democratic presi
dential nomination was one in which he
appeared to deemphasize the sort of is
sues and symbols that were more appar
ent in his 1984 campaign. Jackson’s 1988
campaign was clearly more successful,
i.e., he got more total votes, especially
from whites, than was the case in 1984.
It can be surmised that the 1988 results
were not only influenced by the 1984
contest, but during Jacksons 1988 presi
dential campaign he (and his advisors)
made a decided effort to appeal to white
voters, e.g., farmers and blue collar work
ers, in a way that had not been stressed in
1984.
Jackson also sought in 1988 to avoid
the sort of issues that in 1984 were seen
as a direct challenge to the most ambi
valent part of the Democratic coalition,

white Southerners, e.g., his 1984 call for
the leaderhsip of the national Democratic
Party to dismantle the run-off primary
system in the South.15
Jackson’s performance in the 1988
presidential primaries indicates not only
a greater amount of support among white
voters, but also suggests that these
voters found a less racially intimidating
Jackson in 1988, a possibility that ap
pears to be linked with Jackson’s compar
atively deracialized campaign style.16
This shift in campaign style, from a
more openly racially confrontational one,
to one that placed greater emphasis on
issues that transcended race, may not
have gone unnoticed by many of the Afri
can American victors in the recently held
elections.
In New York and Virginia, Dinkins and
Wilder took a pro-choice stance on the
abortion issue. This racially transcendent
position gained support for both candi
dates from women and pro-choice
activists.
In Cleveland, White was the only can
didate with measurable support among
both African Americans and white voters.
In both Durham and New Haven, biracial, liberal forces joined to defeat pre
dominately white, more conservative
Republican candidates.
Finally, Norman Rice’s opposition to a
busing referendum apparently did him
little harm among the white voters in
Seattle.
While the socioeconomic and demo
graphic circumstances in these seven
large cities and the state of Virginia make
the search for a unifying explanatory
theme difficult, the fairly consistent per
sistence of race as a potentially volatile
issue in American politics suggests that a
political strategy of deemphasizing racially
salient issues may explain why this nation
now has some newly elected African
American mayors and one newly elected
African American governor.
Beyond 1989: A New Black Politics?

What do these recent events portend for
the future? They suggest a number of
things. Among some white voters in this
country, African American candidates for
public office are now seen as less threat
ening. Notwithstanding his self-congra
tulatory claim for credit in the Dinkins
and Wilder victories,1' Jesse Jackson’s
two tries for the Democratic presidential
nomination may have awakened portions

of the white electorate to consider the
non-racial merits of voting for a candidate
who happens to be African American.
Such white voters, it could be argued,
might have voted for African American
candidates even if Jackson had not been
such a dominant player during the 1984
and 1988 presidential campaigns.
While that is indeed a possibility,
speculating about such a possibility
would produce no data from which white
motives for supporting a candidate could
be reliably deduced. What is known,
however, is that most of these victorious
candidates who ran in areas where Afri
can Americans did not constitute the
majority, made appeals to white voters
that were of a deracialized nature. Suffi
cient numbers of white voters responded
to elect these candidates, and the candi
dates realized the strategic necessity of
bringing together bi- or multi-racial coali
tions through the use of an essentially
deracialized issue agenda.
Will such a strategy continue into the
future? There is every reason that Afri
can American candidates for public office
at the state and local levels will continue
to pursue this strategy in the future be
cause it appears to have “worked.”
The cautionary note should be sound
ed, however, that this political strategy is
not foolproof. In two of the more cele
brated contests discussed in this
article—New York City and Virginia—
Dinkins and Wilder barely won. Neither
of these candidates did as well among
white voters as victorious white candi
dates had done among African American
voters in previous elections. White sup
port for African American candidates,
therefore, should be regarded as rather
“soft” perhaps well into the next decade.
What bears closer attention in the future
is the nature of the African American
electorate.
Over the past two decades, in con
tests against white opponents, African
American candidates for public office
have tended to take the African Ameri
can electorate for granted, i.e., that it
would give its overwhelming support.
Given the changing demography of urban
America, African American incumbents
are likely to face challenges from other
African American or Hispanic rivals. The
widening chasm between the increas
ingly suburban middle class and the
urban underclass may lead to the emerg
ence of new candidates—particularly at

the local level—who seek to improve the
material conditions of those at the bot
tom of the socioeconomic order. These
candidates could articulate a more ra
cially specific issue agenda noticeably at
odds with the more deracialized rhetoric
displayed in the recent elections. Such a
scenario could lead to more vigorous
competition for the African American
vote by these candidates.
Finally there is the matter of what all
of this portends for the future of the

The victories of Novem
ber 7, 1989 do not neces
sarily translate into a
Democratic return to the
White House in 1992.

Democratic Party and the 1992 presi
dential election. Before the 1992 presi
dential season gets underway there are
the congressional contests of 1990.
These contests will provide students of
American politics with the next oppor
tunity to gauge the viability and desir
ability of the political strategy of deracialization.
Until that time, speculation will have
to be informed on what is presently
known about the recent past.
The victories of November 7, 1989 do
not necessarily translate into a Demo
cratic return to the White House in 1992.
Only two of the contests examined herein
took place in the “Old South” where white
male Democrats have tended not to sup
port Democratic presidential candidates. 18
Until African American candidates
running for state and local offices in the
South are able to generate winning bi- or
multi-racial support through the use of
deracialized political strategies, it is any
one’s guess what the results of Novem
ber 7, 1989 will hold for 1992. □

Joseph P. McCormick, Ph.D., is an associate pro
fessor in the Department of Political Science at How
ard University.
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